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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
  State National appeals from the dismissal of its 
claims against Donna Whiteside for legal malpractice. The 
District Court dismissed State National’s claims because State 
National could not demonstrate that Whiteside’s actions 
proximately caused State National to suffer any damages. In 
 3 
this case, we must first determine whether this Court has 
jurisdiction over State National’s appeal. Only then may we 
determine whether the District Court erred in dismissing the 
claims against Whiteside. 
 For the reasons that follow, we hold that this Court 
lacks jurisdiction over State National’s appeal because it was 
untimely. Accordingly, we do not reach the merits of State 
National’s claim that Whiteside was improperly dismissed 
from its case. 
I. 
A. Factual History 
 This dispute centers on Donna Whiteside’s 
representation of the County of Camden, New Jersey 
(“County”) in a lawsuit brought by Nicholas Anderson, which 
resulted in a jury award paid, in part, by the County’s excess 
insurer, State National Insurance Company (“State 
National”).  
 On December 23, 2004, Nicholas Anderson was 
seriously injured after crashing his car into a guardrail on a 
road owned and maintained by the County. Anderson filed 
suit against the County for negligence in maintaining the road 
and guardrail and sought $5 million in damages.  
 The County maintained an insurance policy with State 
National whereby the County was responsible for the first 
$300,000 of losses and State National’s obligations were 
triggered only if a potential loss exceeded this amount. In 
order to invoke State National’s coverage obligations, the 
policy required the County to “provide an adequate defense 
and investigation of any action for or notice of any actual, 
potential or alleged damages.” In the event that the County 
failed to meet this requirement, the policy provided that State 
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National “shall not be liable for any damages or costs or 
expenses resulting from any such occurrence.” The policy 
limit was $10 million. 
 Pursuant to the policy, the County utilized its own in-
house attorney, Donna Whiteside, Assistant County Counsel, 
to defend the County against the Anderson lawsuit. 
According to State National, the County did not notify State 
National of the Anderson lawsuit until several months after it 
was filed and after the County first became aware of the 
claims against it. Whiteside initially informed State National 
that the case was meritless and valued it at $50,000. In the 
midst of trial, Whiteside changed her valuation and requested 
the full $10 million policy limit to settle the claims with 
Anderson. After receiving this valuation, State National 
conducted an independent review and denied the County’s 
request for $10 million. After the parties failed to settle, the 
Anderson case continued to trial. On October 17, 2008, the 
jury reached a verdict in favor of Anderson and awarded him 
$31 million, which was later remitted to $19 million. 
B. Procedural History 
 Four days after the verdict in the Anderson case, State 
National filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that it was 
not obligated to provide coverage under the policy because 
the County had breached the policy contract. It alleged that 
the County failed to timely notify State National of the case 
and failed to mount an adequate investigation and defense of 
the lawsuit, as required by the policy. State National also 
asserted claims directly against Whiteside for professional 
negligence, legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
breach of contract. 
 In its first amended complaint, State National alleged 
that Whiteside’s defense of the case fell well below 
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“adequate” because she did not present evidence or assert 
defenses that would have either totally cut off the County’s 
liability or would have substantially lowered Anderson’s 
recovery. Specifically, State National alleges that she did not 
present expert reports or testimony, raise available statutory 
defenses, or cross-examine Anderson’s expert witnesses. 
Because Whiteside advised State National on the case status, 
progress, and likely outcome, State National claims that an 
attorney-client relationship existed between it and Whiteside.  
 Whiteside moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. On 
March 17, 2010, the District Court granted her motion, 
holding that the County and Whiteside were not two distinct 
entities based on respondeat superior and the contract 
between State National and the County, and thus any liability 
of Whiteside must be borne by the County. Moreover, the 
District Court found no proximate cause because if Whiteside 
did not provide an adequate defense, then State National was 
not obligated to pay. But if Whiteside did provide an adequate 
defense, then State National was subject only to its existing 
contractual duty to pay. 
 Following the dismissal, on March 30, 2010, State 
National filed a motion under Rule 59(e), asking the District 
Court to reconsider its dismissal of Whiteside. The District 
Court denied State National’s motion on June 25, 2010. The 
District Court also denied State National’s motion for 
certification under Rule 54(b), which if granted, would have 
allowed State National to immediately appeal Whiteside’s 
dismissal. 
 Although Whiteside was dismissed from the litigation, 
State National’s case against the other defendants went on. 
Over the next four years, all of State National’s claims against 
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the other defendants were resolved, and only the claims 
against the County remained. Eventually, the District Court 
denied State National’s motion for summary judgment on its 
remaining claims against the County. State National alleges 
that in the District Court’s March 31, 2014, order denying 
summary judgment, the District Court undermined its prior 
ruling that served as the basis for dismissing Whiteside. 
Accordingly, State National sought leave to renew its claims 
against Whiteside under Rule 60(b)(6), which permits the 
District Court to grant relief from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding.  
 Before the District Court ruled on State National’s 
Rule 60(b)(6) motion, State National and the County reached 
a settlement. The parties filed a joint Stipulation of Dismissal 
with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) on October 
14, 2014. The Stipulation of Dismissal acknowledged that 
State National wanted to renew its claims against Whiteside, 
but State National made no motion or request before the 
District Court apart from the clause in the Stipulation of 
Dismissal.  
 On December 1, 2014, the District Court denied State 
National’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion to renew the claims against 
Whiteside. It rested on the same reasoning as its earlier ruling 
and rejected State National’s arguments that its March 31, 
2014, order called any of its prior rulings into question. In 
that opinion, the District Court ordered the clerk of court to 
terminate the litigation and close the case. 
 The case was closed on December 1, 2014. State 
National filed its Notice of Appeal on December 16, 2014. In 
the Notice of Appeal, State National sought an appeal from 
the District Court’s December 1, 2014, order denying its 
motion under Rule 60(b)(6) to reinstate its claims against 
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Whiteside. The Notice did not reference the underlying Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal, and it was filed sixty-two days after the 
Stipulation of Dismissal had been entered.  
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332. Before reaching the merits of this appeal, we 
must consider whether we have appellate jurisdiction.1  We 
exercise plenary review in answering this question.2 
 “The timeliness of an appeal is a mandatory 
jurisdictional prerequisite.”3 Under Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(a)(1), the appellant must file a Notice of Appeal 
“with the district clerk within 30 days after entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from.”4 Because the thirty-day 
time limit embodied in Rule 4(a)(1) derives from a statute, it 
is a “jurisdictional requirement.”5 
 In addition to the requirement that it must be timely 
filed, the Notice of Appeal must also specify the “judgment, 
order, or part thereof being appealed.”6 If an appeal is taken 
only from a specified judgment, this Court does not exercise 
                                              
1 Rothman v. United States, 508 F.2d 648, 651 (3d Cir. 
1975) (“Before a court may properly address the merits of an 
appeal, it is mandated to determine whether it has jurisdiction 
to consider the appeal.”). 
2 See In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. 
Liab. Litig. (No. II), 751 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2014). 
3 Poole v. Family Court of New Castle Cty., 368 F.3d 
263, 264 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Robinson, 361 
U.S. 220, 224 (1960)). 
4 Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). 
5 See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). 
6 Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). 
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jurisdiction to review other judgments that were not specified 
or “fairly inferred” by the Notice.7 
 In our case, State National faces two hurdles with 
respect to this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. First, the parties 
voluntarily dismissed this case on October 14, 2014—sixty-
two days before State National filed its Notice of Appeal. 
Because of the mandatory jurisdictional prerequisite 
embodied in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A), 
we permitted the parties to submit supplemental briefing on 
the issue of whether the parties’ voluntary termination of the 
case constituted a final judgment from which the thirty-day 
time limit in Rule 4 began to run.  
 Second, even if the Stipulation of Dismissal did not 
trigger the thirty-day time limit, State National’s Notice of 
Appeal specified only the District Court’s December 1, 2014, 
order denying State National’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. It made 
no mention of the underlying dismissal of Whiteside on Rule 
12(b)(6) grounds. Yet, in its brief before this Court, State 
National argued only that the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was 
error; it made no arguments that the District Court erred in 
denying its motion under Rule 60(b)(6). 
A. 
 The first issue we must address is whether State 
National’s Notice of Appeal was timely. Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) required State National to file 
its Notice of Appeal within thirty days of the judgment it was 
appealing. Here, State National filed its Notice on December 
14, 2014, well within thirty days of the order denying its Rule 
60(b) motion on December 1, 2014. 
                                              
7 Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 184 
(3d Cir. 2010). 
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 Although at first glance, the timeline of State 
National’s appeal seems to comport with the requirements of 
Rule 4, the nature of State National’s Rule 60(b) motion and 
the Stipulation of Dismissal complicate the issue.  
1. State National’s Rule 60(b) Motion 
 The District Court dismissed State National’s claims 
against Whiteside on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds on March 17, 
2010—nearly four and a half years before this appeal was 
taken. After Whiteside’s dismissal, the case was not 
immediately appealable because other parties and claims 
remained in the litigation.8 More than four years later, on 
March 31, 2014, the District Court denied summary judgment 
on State National’s claims against the County. State National, 
believing this opinion called into question Whiteside’s 
dismissal, sought to get another bite at the apple before an 
appeal to this Court.  
 In order to get review of the District Court’s earlier 
dismissal of Whiteside, State National filed a Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion on April 25, 2014, asking the District Court to 
reconsider its prior dismissal. Although Rule 59(e) would 
have been the most obvious route to get reconsideration of the 
prior dismissal, State National had already done so four years 
earlier. Without the ability to file a timely motion under Rule 
                                              
8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“[A]ny order or other decision, 
however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims 
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does 
not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may 
be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and 
liabilities.”). 
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59(e),9 State National attempted to reinstate its claims against 
Whiteside using Rule 60(b)(6), which provides that “the court 
may relieve a party … from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for … any other reason that justifies relief.”10 
 But Rule 60(b) grants the district court the power to 
relieve a party from a “final judgment, order, or 
proceeding.”11 The March 17, 2010, order dismissing 
Whiteside—and not all of the defendants—was not a final 
order. Rather, it was an interlocutory order that was not 
immediately appealable unless the District Court certified it 
under Rule 54(b), which it refused to do.12 Thus, because the 
underlying dismissal of Whiteside was not a “final judgment, 
                                              
9 Rule 59(e) requires the motion to reconsider the 
judgment be filed “no later than 28 days after the entry of 
judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Whiteside was dismissed 
four years before State National filed its motion to renew its 
claims against Whiteside.  
10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). 
11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis added); see also 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee’s note to 1946 
amendment (“The addition of the qualifying word ‘final’ 
emphasizes the character of the judgments, orders or 
proceedings from which Rule 60(b) affords relief; and hence 
interlocutory judgments are not brought within the restrictions 
of the rule, but rather they are left subject to the complete 
power of the court rendering them to afford such relief from 
them as justice requires.”). 
12 “When an action presents more than one claim for 
relief … or when multiple parties are involved, the court may 
direct entry as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or 
parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no 
just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
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order, or proceeding,” State National’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion 
was not a proper avenue by which to challenge her 
dismissal.13 
 Apart from Rule 60(b), the District Court has the 
inherent power to reconsider prior interlocutory orders. Under 
its inherent powers, the District Court could have reinstated 
Whiteside at any point during which the litigation continued. 
The power to reconsider prior interlocutory orders depends on 
the District Court retaining jurisdiction over the case.14  
2. The Stipulation of Dismissal 
 The parties, however, filed a Stipulation of Dismissal 
under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), and pursuant to that Stipulation, 
the parties agreed to voluntarily dismiss the case. Rule 
41(a)(1)(A)(ii) provides that “the plaintiff may dismiss an 
                                              
13 See Torres v. Chater, 125 F.3d 166, 167-68 (3d Cir. 
1997); see also Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & O Enters., Inc., 773 
F.2d 151, 154 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Rule 60(b) must be limited to 
review of orders that are independently ‘final decisions’ 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A party should not get immediate 
review of an order for discovery, or one denying summary 
judgment and setting the case for trial, just by filing a Rule 
60(b) motion to set aside the order and then appealing the 
denial of this motion.”). 
14 See United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 605 (3d 
Cir. 1973) (“[S]o long as the district court has jurisdiction 
over the case, it possesses inherent power over interlocutory 
orders, and can reconsider them when it is consonant with 
justice to do so.”) (emphasis added); United States v. 
LoRusso, 695 F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1982) (“A district court has 
the inherent power to reconsider and modify its interlocutory 
orders prior to the entry of judgment ….”) (emphasis added). 
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action without a court order by filing … a stipulation of 
dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.”15  
 The language of the rule makes clear that a dismissal 
under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) does not require a court order, nor 
does it require the approval of the court.16 Because a 
dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) does not require a court 
order or approval, we have held that “[t]he entry of such a 
stipulation of dismissal is effective automatically.”17  
 State National’s argument that Rule 58 requires a 
separate entry of judgment is unavailing. Every court to have 
considered the nature of a voluntary stipulation of dismissal 
under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) has come to the conclusion that it 
is immediately self-executing.18 No separate entry or order is 
required to effectuate the dismissal. 
 Once the voluntary stipulation is filed, the action on 
the merits is at an end.19 “[A]ny action by the district court 
after the filing of [the Stipulation of Dismissal] can have no 
                                              
15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
16 Id.; see also 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2363 (3d ed. 2015). 
17 First Nat’l Bank of Toms River, N.J. v. Marine City, 
Inc., 411 F.2d 674, 677 (3d Cir. 1969). 
18 E.g., Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 
F.3d 1272, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2012); De Leon v. Marcos, 659 
F.3d 1276, 1283 (10th Cir. 2011); SmallBizPros, Inc. v. 
MacDonald, 618 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010); Jenkins v. 
Vill. of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 2007); 
Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 
1984).  
19 Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 
1989). 
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force or effect because the matter has already been 
dismissed.”20 A voluntary dismissal deprives the District 
Court of jurisdiction over the action.  
 The Dissent criticizes our discussion of Anago 
Franchising, SmallBizPros, and Smith as a line of cases 
arising out of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kokkonen v. 
Guardian Life Insurance Company of America.21 But 
Kokkonen is not relevant here. Kokkonen speaks to the 
District Court’s ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the settlement 
agreement that served as a basis for the parties’ stipulated 
dismissal. In this case, the parties are not concerned with 
enforcing their settlement agreement. Rather, we are 
concerned with the District Court’s jurisdiction over the 
original matter. 
 The Dissent misinterprets the basis of our holding: 
Kokkonen does not compel the conclusion that the Stipulation 
of Dismissal divested the District Court of jurisdiction; the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do. Long before the 
Supreme Court decided Kokkonen, we held that a stipulated 
dismissal under Rule 41 was automatic.22 We have also held 
that a “timely notice of voluntary dismissal invites no 
response from the district court and permits no interference 
                                              
20 SmallBizPros, 618 F.3d at 463; see also Anago 
Franchising, 677 F.3d at 1279-80 (“A district court loses all 
power over determinations of the merits of a case when it is 
voluntarily dismissed.”); Versata Software, Inc. v. Callidus 
Software, Inc., 780 F.3d 1134, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(vacating its own opinion, which was issued after the parties 
voluntarily dismissed their case pursuant to Rule 
41(a)(1)(A)(ii)). 
21 Dissent at 6-7 n.2. 
22 First Nat’l Bank, 411 F.2d at 677. 
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by it.”23 The Dissent attempts to distinguish the cases cited 
here as merely invoking the Kokkonen principle, but both 
Versata Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software, Inc. and 
Meinecke v. H&R Block of Houston focus on the broader 
concerns relevant here. 
 In Versata Software, the Federal Circuit vacated its 
own opinion because it was issued after the parties voluntarily 
dismissed their case before the case had been decided.24 
Recognizing that the joint stipulation of dismissal between 
the parties automatically dismissed the case “with no further 
action of the district court required,” the Federal Circuit held 
that “there was no longer a controversy” pertinent to the 
parties’ appeal.25 
 Similarly, in Meinecke v. H&R Block of Houston, the 
Fifth Circuit held that the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants was “of no consequence” 
because the parties had three days earlier filed a stipulation of 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).26 Even though the 
District Court’s order approving of the stipulated dismissal 
was handed down on the same day as the order granting 
summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit recognized that the 
dismissal was effective when filed, and “any further actions 
by the court [were] superfluous.”27 
3. The Final Judgment 
  After the stipulated dismissal, there was nothing left 
                                              
23 In re Bath & Kitchen Fixtures Antitrust Litig., 535 
F.3d 161, 165 (3d Cir. 2008). 
24 780 F.3d at 1136. 
25 Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank, 411 F.2d 674). 
26 66 F.3d 77, 82 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). 
27 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 15 
for the District Court to do. The Stipulation of Dismissal 
“resolv[ed] the matter.”28 “A final judgment is ‘one which 
ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the 
court to do but execute the judgment.’”29 A final order 
accomplishes two ends: it disposes of all of the claims 
presented to the district court, and it leaves “nothing further 
for the district court to do.”30 
 Following the Stipulation of Dismissal, all of the 
claims against all of the parties remaining in the litigation had 
been resolved. Because Whiteside was no longer a party to 
the litigation, and the District Court had not exercised its 
inherent power to review its previous interlocutory order 
dismissing her, the only claims remaining were the claims 
asserted by State National against the County. Because the 
Stipulation of Dismissal resolved these claims, the Stipulation 
of Dismissal was a final judgment. 31 
                                              
28 Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 970 n.9 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
29 Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 419 (2008). 
30 Michelson v. Citicorp Nat’l Servs., Inc., 138 F.3d 
508, 513 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 31 This Court and others have also recognized that a 
voluntary dismissal with prejudice constitutes a final order, 
thereby making interlocutory orders appealable. See, e.g., 
Blue v. D.C. Pub. Schs., 764 F.3d 11, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(stating that “[e]very circuit permits a plaintiff, in at least 
some circumstances, voluntarily to dismiss remaining claims 
or remaining parties from an action as a way to conclude the 
whole case in the district court and ready it for appeal” and 
collecting cases); M&K Welding, Inc. v. Leasing Partners, 
LLC, 386 F.3d 361, 364 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
parties’ Stipulation of Dismissal with prejudice was a final 
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 State National’s Rule 60(b) motion did not prevent the 
Stipulation of Dismissal from serving as the final judgment. 
State National’s claims against Whiteside had already been 
resolved, and every available method of reinstating its claims 
against her had been exhausted.32 State National cannot rely 
on an improper procedural motion to argue that its own 
dismissal of the case was not a final judgment. Because the 
District Court could not have reinstated the claims against 
Whiteside after the stipulated dismissal, there was “nothing 
further for the district court to do.”33 
 Nor does the single statement in the Stipulation of 
Dismissal that nothing in the settlement “shall be construed in 
any way to release or otherwise limit the claims State 
National has asserted or may assert against Donna Whiteside” 
prevent finality. The parties did not make their dismissal 
contingent on the District Court’s ruling on State National’s 
                                                                                                     
judgment); O’Boyle v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 866 F.2d 88, 92 
(3d Cir. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal 
of his claims with prejudice constituted a final order that was 
appealable); Nat’l Inspection & Repairs, Inc. v. George S. 
May Int’l. Co., 600 F.3d 878, 883-84 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that, because the claims were dismissed with prejudice, there 
was a final judgment for purposes of appellate review). See 
also 15A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 3914.8 (2d ed. 2015) (“Voluntary 
dismissal of the remaining parts of the case provides an 
obvious means of achieving final disposition.”). 
32 Anago Franchising, 677 F.3d at 1275 (“[V]oluntary 
dismissal of a case strips the court of jurisdiction and leaves it 
without the power to make legal determinations on the 
merits.”). 
33 See Michelson, 138 F.3d at 513. 
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Rule 60(b) motion. And the parties did not make a motion 
before the District Court for it to decide on whether the 
claims against Whiteside should be reinstated before 
dismissing the case. Moreover, State National and the County 
cannot speak for Whiteside in their stipulated dismissal; 
Whiteside had already been dismissed from the litigation 
years earlier. 
 The Dissent argues that, because the District Court 
“[a]fter the stipulation of dismissal … both accepted briefing 
from the parties and issued an order permitting additional 
briefing,” the District Court “intended to retain jurisdiction 
until it ruled on State National’s motion”34 and “to exercise 
its inherent power to reconsider [its prior] decision.”35 The 
District Court’s actions, however, cannot override the 
application of jurisdictional rules, as both this Court and the 
Supreme Court have held. The Dissent’s position is just dead 
wrong. 
 In Lizardo v. United States, we held that an untimely 
Rule 59(e) motion does not toll the time to appeal under Rule 
4(a)(4)(A) “even if the party opposing the motion did not 
object to the motion’s untimeliness and the district court 
considered the motion on the merits.”36 We expressed 
concern about basing the timeliness of post-judgment motions 
on what occurred in the District Court because such a system 
would inject uncertainty into the appeal timeline and would 
be based on the “happenstance of a particular litigation.”37 
Instead, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require 
                                              
34 Dissent at 9. 
35 Dissent at 4. 
36 Lizardo v. United States, 619 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 
2010) (emphasis added). 
37 Id. at 279. 
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uniformity. Thus, we held that the appellant’s appeal was 
untimely even though the District Court in that case had ruled 
on the merits of his Rule 59(e) motion. 
 Similarly, the Supreme Court, in Bowles v. Russell, in 
rejecting the “unique circumstances doctrine,”38 held that a 
District Court’s assurances about timeliness, and a party’s 
good faith reliance on them, are not enough to cure a 
jurisdictional defect.39 There, the District Court had told the 
appellant Bowles that he had seventeen days to file his notice 
of appeal. In reality, he had only fourteen. Bowles filed his 
notice of appeal on the sixteenth day—one day before the 
District Court’s deadline and two days after the actual 
deadline.40 The deadline was jurisdictional, and as a result, it 
could not be tolled or waived. Thus, the Court held, his notice 
of appeal was untimely, and it dismissed his appeal.41 
 These cases demonstrate that no matter how well-
meaning the District Court’s actions may be, they cannot 
confer jurisdiction where it is lacking. And the District 
Court’s erroneous consideration of an improper or untimely 
motion cannot alter the timeliness requirements of Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). In this case, the District 
Court’s consideration of State National’s Rule 60(b) motion 
cannot confer jurisdiction where the case had already been 
dismissed. Because of the dismissal, no claims remained 
against any party still involved in the litigation; the stipulated 
                                              
38 “The “unique circumstances doctrine” permitted 
appellate courts to excuse untimeliness where a party 
belatedly acted in reliance on an erroneous district court 
ruling.” Mobley v. C.I.A., 806 F.3d 568, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
39 551 U.S. 205, 214-15 (2007). 
40 Id. at 207. 
41 Id. at 206-07, 215. 
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dismissal was the final decision. 
4. Appealability and Tolling 
 Once an order becomes “final,” the time for appeal 
begins to run.42 Following the final judgment, Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides that the party wishing to 
appeal has thirty days to do so. State National did not file 
within thirty days of its joint Stipulation of Dismissal—the 
final judgment. Therefore, State National’s appeal—sixty-two 
days after the final judgment—was untimely. The thirty-day 
time requirement in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) 
is jurisdictional and mandatory, and the failure to comport 
with this mandatory deadline deprives this Court of appellate 
jurisdiction. 
 Contrary to State National’s contention, none of the 
tolling provisions of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(a)(4)(A) is applicable here. State National argues that its 
Rule 60(b) motion tolled the time to file its appeal. Under 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A)(vi), a Rule 
60(b) motion “filed no later than 28 days after the judgment is 
entered,” tolls the time to file an appeal.43  The time to appeal 
runs from the entry of the order disposing of the Rule 60(b) 
motion. But as previously explained, State National’s motion 
to renew its claims was not a proper Rule 60(b) motion. 
“[T]he function of the motion, and not the caption, dictates 
which Rule is applicable.”44 Because State National’s motion 
was not actually a Rule 60(b) motion, its motion to renew its 
claims against Whiteside cannot extend the time to file an 
                                              
42 Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d at 970 n.9.  
43 Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). 
44 United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 287-88 (3d 
Cir. 2003). 
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appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(a)(4)(A)(vi).  
 State National’s motion was also not a timely Rule 
59(e) motion that could operate to extend the time to file a 
timely appeal. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(a)(4)(A)(iv), if a party timely files a motion to alter or 
amend the judgment under Rule 59, the time to file an appeal 
runs from the entry of the order disposing of such motion. A 
Rule 59 motion is timely when it is filed within twenty-eight 
days of the order or judgment for which reconsideration is 
sought.45 State National had previously filed a timely Rule 59 
motion on March 20, 2010, immediately after Whiteside was 
first dismissed from the litigation.46 Its motion to renew its 
claims against Whiteside, which State National contends tolls 
the time to appeal, was not filed within twenty-eight days of 
Whiteside’s dismissal and thus cannot extend the time for 
State National to appeal.  
 The Dissent questions why we cannot consider State 
National’s Rule 60(b) motion as a premature motion that 
“ripened” after the Stipulation of Dismissal was filed. Even if 
we assume that State National’s Rule 60(b) motion was the 
proper means of getting review of Whiteside’s dismissal, it 
would still not toll the time to appeal. This is because Federal 
                                              
45 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. 
46 The Dissent does not address this fact, but it is an 
important one. The Rule 60(b) motion was another attempt by 
State National to relitigate Whiteside’s dismissal. But the 
District Court’s decision denying State National’s Rule 59(e) 
motion—as well as its decision granting Whiteside’s 
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)—could have been appealed 
when the clock ran from the date the Stipulation of Dismissal 
was entered. 
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Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A)(iv) permits tolling of 
the time to appeal if a Rule 60 motion is “filed no later than 
28 days after the judgment is entered.” In State National’s 
view, the judgment entered is Whiteside’s dismissal. 
However, that judgment was entered years before State 
National filed its Rule 60(b) motion. Thus, under either view 
of the nature of State National’s Rule 60(b) motion, tolling is 
inapplicable.47 
 The Dissent also argues that “motions invoking Rule 
60(b) should be treated flexibly and functionally.”48 In 
making this argument, the Dissent relies on Torres v. Charter, 
in which this Court allowed appeal of the denial of a Rule 
60(b) motion, even though the motion sought review of a 
supposedly interlocutory order.49 In that case, however, the 
“interlocutory” order subject to the Rule 60(b) motion was a 
district court’s order to remand a claimant’s Social Security 
disability claim to the Commissioner of the Social Security 
Administration. This Court explained that if we did not 
entertain the appeal, “on remand the claimant may receive an 
award of benefits, in which event he will not appeal, and it is 
very doubtful the Commissioner could appeal.”50 Under those 
                                              
47 The Dissent also claims that we are “abolishing Rule 
60(b) relief for parties in State National’s position.” Dissent 
at 17 n.7. But this is far from the case. Because State 
National’s motion sought review of an interlocutory order, it 
was not a true Rule 60(b) motion. We do not suggest that 
State National could never have sought Rule 60(b) relief—
only that it could not do so before a “final judgment, order, or 
proceeding.”  
48 Dissent at 13. 
49 125 F.3d at 168-69. 
50 Id. at 168. 
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circumstances, we held that such an order was final and could 
be the basis for a Rule 60(b) motion because it was likely that 
appellant would be unable to secure appellate review of that 
decision. That situation is not applicable here. After the 
stipulated dismissal, State National could have appealed the 
underlying dismissal of Whiteside on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds. 
Thus, State National was not unable to secure appellate 
review of Whiteside’s dismissal, and Torres’s exception to 
the requirement of finality for Rule 60(b) motions is 
inapposite. 
 It is strict to require State National to file an appeal 
while the District Court was apparently still considering State 
National’s Rule 60(b) motion, even if it was an improper one. 
But jurisdiction is a “strict master.”51 The Stipulation of 
Dismissal was effective immediately, and because all of the 
remaining claims were resolved by that Stipulation, the 
stipulated dismissal was a final judgment from which the time 
to appeal began to run. State National’s failure to appeal 
within thirty days of the final judgment deprives this Court of 
jurisdiction to hear its appeal. The District Court’s 
consideration of a motion that it lacked the power to grant or 
deny cannot excuse this failure. 
B. 
 Because we hold that we lack jurisdiction on the basis 
of State National’s untimely notice of appeal, we do not reach 
the alternative jurisdictional argument advanced by Whiteside 
that a notice of appeal that references only an order denying a 
Rule 60(b) motion does not draw into question an underlying 
                                              
51 SmallBizPros, Inc., 618 F.3d at 464. 
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dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).52 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss this case for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
                                              
52 See Elliot v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 219 
(3d Cir. 2012) (“[I]f we determine that we do not have 
jurisdiction over this appeal, our ‘only function remaining [is] 
that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’” 
(quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 
94 (1998))). 
  
State National Insurance Co. v. County of Camden et al., No. 
14-4766 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.  
The Majority acknowledges that its interpretation of 
the operative rules of procedure is “strict.”  (Majority Op. at 
22.)  But the interpretation goes beyond strict; with all 
respect, it is wrong.  I therefore dissent from the dismissal of 
the appeal. 
 
Here are the key procedural steps and the dates on 
which they occurred.  The District Court dismissed State 
National Insurance Company’s claims against Donna 
Whiteside in an order dated March 17, 2010.  Over four years 
later, on April 25, 2014, State National filed a motion for 
leave to renew its malpractice claims against Whiteside,1 
styled as a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).  The 
District Court initiated active litigation by soliciting briefing 
and ordering settlement negotiations.  The litigation 
proceeded between Whiteside and State National with neither 
party questioning the District Court’s jurisdiction.  During the 
battle over the motion to reinstate the claims against 
Whiteside, State National separately entered a stipulation of 
dismissal with the County of Camden on October 14, 2014.  
Nothing in the stipulation limited State National’s efforts to 
renew its claims against Whiteside.  On the contrary, the 
stipulation provided that it should not be construed “in any 
way to release or otherwise limit” those claims.  (App. 326.)  
                                              
1 State National’s claims against Whiteside comprised 
allegations of professional negligence, legal malpractice, 
breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. 
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The District Court then entered an order, on December 1, 
2014, denying State National’s motion for leave to proceed 
with its claims against Whiteside, and, in the same order, 
directed that the matter be marked as closed.  State National 
filed its notice of appeal on December 16, 2014.   
 
As my colleagues in the Majority see it, even though 
State National was trying to obey court orders to actively 
litigate its motion to reinstate its claims against Whiteside, it 
was actually allowing the clock to run on its time to appeal.  
All that litigation wound up being a nullity.  It turns out that, 
unbeknownst to the District Court or the parties, State 
National was foolishly forfeiting claims worth perhaps 
millions of dollars.  As the Majority would have it, State 
National could only maintain its appeal rights by choosing 
between two bad alternatives: it could abandon its settlement 
of its separate claim against the County, or it could appeal the 
dismissal of the claims against Whiteside even as the District 
Court was actively reconsidering that dismissal.  The federal 
rules of civil procedure and of appellate procedure are meant 
to permit the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action and proceeding,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, and to allow 
district courts to fully resolve all issues in the first instance so 
that appellate review is not “piecemeal,”  Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).  It would therefore be 
strange if the rules really did put State National in that bind.  
But, properly understood, they do not. 
 
The Majority has the rules wrong, but it is correct that 
the October 14, 2014 stipulation of dismissal terminated the 
litigation between State National and the County.  It is also 
correct that the District Court had the power to reinstate the 
claims against Whiteside either through its inherent powers to 
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reverse an interlocutory decision or through ruling on a Rule 
60 motion.  The Majority incorrectly concludes, however, that 
the District Court failed to reinstate State National’s claims 
through either of those means.  I disagree.  Though the 
stipulation of dismissal did terminate State National’s suit 
against the County, it did nothing to divest the Court of 
jurisdiction over the entirely separate claims against 
Whiteside.  Therefore, whether characterized as a motion 
invoking the District Court’s inherent power or a Rule 60(b) 
motion, State National’s motion did keep the matter against 
Whiteside open until it was resolved by the District Court.  
Therefore, the time to appeal did not begin to run until the 
Court issued its December 1, 2014 order denying the motion, 
and State National’s appeal is timely.   
 
I. Discussion 
 
My colleagues acknowledge that, before the County 
and State National filed their stipulation of dismissal, the 
District Court had inherent authority to reinstate the claims 
against Whiteside.  They also seemingly recognize that, had 
the order dismissing Whiteside been final before the 
stipulation of dismissal, the District Court could have given 
State National relief under Rule 60(b).  But they nevertheless 
hold that State National can get the benefit of neither of those 
avenues for relief.  The Majority says instead that the Court’s 
inherent authority was lost when the stipulation of dismissal 
was entered, and that Rule 60(b) relief was unavailable before 
the stipulation of dismissal was entered because the order 
dismissing Whiteside was not final.  I reject both of those 
conclusions and would hold that State National could have 
received relief from the District Court by either route. 
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A. The District Court’s Jurisdiction Under Its 
Inherent Authority 
 
The clearest way to resolve the question of timeliness 
would be to rule that the dismissal of State National’s claims 
against Whiteside was not final until December 1, 2014, when 
the District Court denied State National’s motion to renew its 
claims.  It is true that the claims against Whiteside had earlier 
been dismissed by what all agree was an interlocutory order, 
but the District Court chose to exercise its inherent power to 
reconsider that decision.  State National filed its motion for 
leave to renew its claims against Whiteside on April 25, 2014, 
and three days later, the District Court set deadlines for 
considering the motion.  Both sides then actively litigated the 
matter until it was finally decided on December 1.  That was 
thus the true date of final judgment on the claims against 
Whiteside, at which point the time to appeal began to run. 
 
The Majority reaches a contrary conclusion by saying 
that the District Court was divested of any jurisdiction over 
the claims against Whiteside when State National and the 
County filed a stipulation of dismissal on October 14, 2014.  
My colleagues seem to agree that, just a day earlier, the 
dismissal of the claims against Whiteside was interlocutory 
and unappealable, and that the District Court was free to 
reinstate the claims against Whiteside.  Yet, even as the 
District Court was actively considering doing just that, it lost 
jurisdiction, according to the Majority, because the plaintiff’s 
claim against a separate defendant was settled. 
 
To reach that conclusion, my colleagues rely upon a 
series of cases that stand only for the unremarkable 
proposition that when a plaintiff and a defendant resolve their 
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dispute through a Rule 41 stipulation of dismissal, that 
dispute ends and the district court loses jurisdiction.  None of 
the cases they cite, however, suggests that the stipulation has 
any effect on ongoing litigation with a third party who is 
expressly excluded from the stipulation of dismissal. 
 
The two cases that the Majority considers in detail are 
illustrative.  In Versata Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software, 
Inc., the Federal Circuit concluded that a pending 
interlocutory appeal was mooted when the two parties 
terminated their litigation through a Rule 41 stipulation of 
dismissal.  780 F.3d 1134, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  I agree that 
any pending appeal between State National and the County 
would have been mooted by their stipulation of dismissal, but 
that says nothing about the separate claims against Whiteside. 
 
In Meinecke v. H & R Block of Houston, the Fifth 
Circuit voided a district court’s grant of summary judgment 
on claims that had already been resolved by a Rule 41 
stipulation of dismissal.  66 F.3d 77, 82 (5th Cir. 1995).  Of 
note, not only did that decision fail to affect non-parties to the 
stipulation of dismissal; it did not even affect all the claims 
among the parties to the stipulation.  Immediately after 
declaring contract claims against a defendant resolved by the 
stipulation, the court went on to consider summary judgment 
on discrimination claims against the very same defendant that 
had not been resolved by the stipulation.  Id. at 82-83.  Just as 
the Meinecke court could distinguish between claims resolved 
by a stipulation of dismissal and those unaffected by it, we 
should similarly distinguish between those claims terminated 
in State National’s stipulation of dismissal with the County 
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and those claims, against an entirely separate party, that were 
expressly excluded from the stipulation.2 
                                              
2 My colleagues in the majority also cite several cases 
relying on the Supreme Court’s discussion of Rule 
41(a)(1)(A)(ii) in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance 
Company of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994).  In Kokkonen, the 
Supreme Court considered whether, after the parties entered a 
stipulation of dismissal under what is now Rule 
41(a)(1)(A)(ii), a district court could exercise ancillary 
jurisdiction to enforce those parties’ settlement agreement.  
Id. at 378.  The Court determined that, if the stipulation was 
entered without any formal endorsement by the district court, 
the court lost jurisdiction over enforcement.  Id. at 380-81. 
My colleagues agree that Kokkonen speaks only to a 
district court’s ancillary jurisdiction and that the concern in 
the present case is instead with “jurisdiction over the original 
matter.”  (Majority Op. at 13.)  Nevertheless, they cite several 
cases from other Circuits applying the Kokkonen principle.  
E.g., Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272, 
1279-80 (11th Cir. 2012); SmallBizPros, Inc. v. MacDonald, 
618 F.3d 458, 463-64 (5th Cir. 2010); Smith v. Phillips, 881 
F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 1989).  None of those cases involved 
an additional party actively litigating separate issues unrelated 
to the stipulation of dismissal.  In such a case, which is what 
we have before us now, a district court has ongoing subject-
matter jurisdiction without any need to assert ancillary 
jurisdiction, so the holding in Kokkonen is not in play. 
Kokkonen is instructive, however, because it tests the 
constitutional bounds of district courts’ subject-matter 
jurisdiction following a stipulation of dismissal.  Even if 
those strictures applied to this case, which they do not, the 
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correct conclusion is that the District Court did retain 
jurisdiction over the claims against Whiteside.  In Kokkonen, 
the Supreme Court made clear that a district court can retain 
jurisdiction over a case wholly resolved by a stipulation of 
dismissal as long as it does so explicitly, even to enforce a 
settlement agreement collateral to the underlying litigation.  
511 U.S. at 381.  In this case, the District Court was actively 
considering the case against Whiteside and thus made 
manifest its intention to retain jurisdiction.  The conduct of 
the Court and the parties indicates that all of them shared that 
understanding.  Indeed, the stipulation of dismissal explicitly 
confirmed as much, saying, “Nothing herein shall be 
construed in any way to release or otherwise limit the claims 
State National has asserted or may assert against Donna 
Whiteside arising out of her alleged legal malpractice ... .”  
(App. 326.)  On these facts, I would conclude that, even if 
Kokkonen applied, the District Court acted effectively before 
the stipulation of dismissal to assert its continuing jurisdiction 
over the claims against Whiteside. 
That conclusion is bolstered by our Court’s liberal 
standard for evaluating a district court’s retention of 
jurisdiction following a settlement agreement.  There is not 
any magic form of words that the judge must 
intone in order to make the retention of 
jurisdiction effective. All that is necessary is 
that it be possible to infer that he did intend to 
retain jurisdiction – that he did not dismiss the 
case outright, thereby relinquishing jurisdiction. 
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In short, I do not dispute that we have long held that “a 
stipulated dismissal under Rule 41 [is] automatic.”  (Majority 
Op. at 13 (citing First Nat. Bank of Toms River, N.J. v. 
Marine City, Inc., 411 F.2d 674, 677 (3d Cir. 1969)).)  What I 
do dispute is that a stipulation that resolves certain claims 
somehow nullifies ongoing litigation of separate claims 
against a separate party. 
 
My colleagues’ implicit assumption is that the case 
against Whiteside was dormant, awaiting only the completion 
of the suit against the County to become final and appealable.  
But, in reality, the District Court was actively overseeing 
litigation between Whiteside and State National on whether to 
allow renewal of the claims against Whiteside, so that the 
matter was far from resolved.  On September 10, 2014 – over 
a month before the stipulation of dismissal – the Court 
ordered State National and Whiteside to participate in 
settlement discussions before a magistrate judge.  Those 
discussions took place on September 24.  When they failed to 
produce a settlement, the Court granted Whiteside’s request 
to file a supplemental brief on September 25, and then, on 
October 2, ordered Whiteside to file the brief within 30 days.  
That brief was filed on October 15, one day after the 
stipulation of dismissal.  On October 16 – now two days after 
the stipulation – the Court issued an order granting State 
National’s request to file a response to Whiteside’s brief, and 
that response was filed on October 24.  All this culminated in 
                                                                                                     
Halderman by Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 
901 F.2d 311, 317 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting McCall-Bey v. 
Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1188 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
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the District Court’s December 1, 2014 order denying the 
motion for leave to renew the claims against Whiteside.  
 
 The ongoing litigation over the Whiteside claims 
demonstrates that the case was open and active.  In resolving 
the motion to reinstate the claims against Whiteside, the 
District Court was simply exercising its “jurisdiction over the 
original matter,” (Majority Op. at 13), congruent with the 
settlement’s terms that “State National intends to maintain its 
claims against Donna Whiteside.”  (App. 332.)  After the 
stipulation of dismissal between State National and the 
County, the Court both accepted briefing from State National 
and Whiteside and issued an order permitting additional 
briefing.  It quite obviously intended to retain jurisdiction 
until it ruled on State National’s motion, and the parties 
understood the case against Whiteside to be active and 
unaffected by the stipulation.3 
 
The Majority emphasizes that the “District Court’s 
actions ... cannot override the application of jurisdictional 
rules.”  (Majority Op. at 17.)  I do not disagree, and I concur 
with my colleagues’ readings of Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 
205 (2007), and Lizardo v. United States, 619 F.3d 273 (3d 
                                              
 3 The Majority contends, to the contrary, that “the 
parties did not make a motion before the District Court for it 
to decide on whether the claims against Whiteside should be 
reinstated before dismissing the case.”  (Majority Op. at 17.)  
But that is simply not so.  State National filed its motion for 
leave to renew its malpractice claims against Whiteside on 
April 25, 2014, almost six months before the stipulation of 
dismissal. 
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Cir. 2010), that a district court’s mistaken consideration of 
untimely motions does not excuse the untimeliness.  That, 
however, merely demonstrates that my colleagues are asking 
the wrong question.  If the case against Whiteside had 
definitively ended in 2010, it would be true that the District 
Court’s subsequent actions in 2014 were irrelevant.  But the 
2010 order dismissing Whiteside was not final; “it was an 
interlocutory order that was not immediately appealable.”  
(Majority Op. at 10.)  Therefore, until the entire case was 
made final, the District Court had ongoing inherent authority 
to revise its interlocutory order and revive the suit against 
Whiteside.  The question before us is whether it did so revive 
the suit.  Its actions and intentions in ordering active litigation 
on the claims against Whiteside, and the parties’ 
understanding of those actions, certainly are relevant to that 
determination and prove that the litigation between State 
National and Whiteside was revived and active.  In fact, 
everybody associated with the litigation, except for the two 
members of the Majority, understood it that way.  Cf. infra 
pp. 15-16. 
 
B. Rule 60(b) Motion Seeking Relief from a 
 Final Order 
 
The Majority rejects the above reasoning by 
concluding that the moment the stipulation of dismissal was 
filed, the dismissal of the claims against Whiteside became 
final, and all issues among all parties were resolved.  It thus 
concludes that the time to appeal began to run on that date.  
Even if the stipulation of dismissal ended the case as to all 
claims against all parties (which it did not), we should still 
not dismiss this appeal but should instead treat State 
National’s pending motion as a Rule 60(b) motion for post-
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judgment relief.4  That, in turn, would mean that the time to 
appeal was tolled until the motion was resolved.  See Fed. R. 
App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). 
 
State National’s motion was, in fact, framed in terms 
of Rule 60(b)(6), so it is puzzling that the Majority is at such 
pains to avoid treating it that way.  Since my colleagues are 
adamant that the stipulation of dismissal made all 
interlocutory orders final, they should be glad to treat the 
further litigation as having proceeded under the terms of Rule 
60(b).  Instead, they insist that the pending motion was 
invalid, so that the ongoing litigation before the District Court 
was meaningless. 
 
There are, however, two ways that the District Court 
could have properly considered State National’s motion as a 
Rule 60(b) request for relief from final judgment.  First, it 
could have treated the 60(b) motion as legitimate even 
though, when it was filed, there was no final order in the case.  
That approach is, admittedly, in tension with my conclusion 
that the motion is better considered under the District Court’s 
inherent power to review interlocutory orders.  But our Court 
has previously considered appeals from denials of Rule 60(b) 
motions that concerned interlocutory orders, and we could do 
so here if we opted not to analyze the motion as invoking the 
District Court’s inherent power.  In the alternative, accepting 
that the motion was premature when filed, the District Court 
                                              
4 Rule 60(b) allows a court, on “motion and just 
terms,” to “relieve a party or its legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding ... .”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
60(b). 
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could properly have treated it as ripening into a Rule 60(b) 
motion once the stipulation of dismissal made the underlying 
interlocutory order final. 
 
1. State National’s Motion as an Ongoing 
 Rule 60(b) Motion 
  
 The first avenue – that by which the District Court was 
free to consider State National’s motion under Rule 60(b) 
from the time the motion was filed – is supported by the 
generally flexible treatment our Court has given Rule 60(b) 
motions.  It is true, as we said in Torres v. Chater, that by its 
own terms, Rule 60(b) applies only to “final” judgments, 
orders, and proceedings, so that “purely interlocutory” orders 
are “not within the scope of Rule 60(b).”  125 F.3d 166, 168 
(3d Cir. 1997).  But that principle simply governs whether the 
strictures of Rule 60(b) apply, not whether a district court can 
consider more generally a motion to alter an interlocutory 
decision.  As the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 60 
explain in describing the finality requirement, “interlocutory 
judgments are not brought within the restrictions of the rule, 
but rather they are left subject to the complete power of the 
court rendering them to afford such relief from them as 
justice requires.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee’s 
note to 1946 amendment (emphasis added); see also United 
States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 605 (3d Cir. 1973) (“[S]o long 
as the district court has jurisdiction over the case, it possesses 
inherent power over interlocutory orders, and can reconsider 
them when it is consonant with justice to do so.”).  Because a 
motion for relief from an interlocutory order is treated more 
liberally than a 60(b) motion, there is no reason to consider 
State National’s original motion as a nullity simply because it 
was presented under Rule 60(b)(6). 
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Our case law makes clear that motions invoking Rule 
60(b) should be treated flexibly and functionally.  In Torres, 
while we said that Rule 60(b) applied only to final orders, we 
did so in reaching the conclusion that a Rule 60(b) motion 
was not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 unless it related to 
a final order.  Torres, 125 F.3d at 168.  The point was to 
prevent untimely appeals and to direct district courts to 
resolve all issues before a party was put to the choice of filing 
an appeal.  The goal of our opinion in Torres was precisely 
contrary to the purposes for which the Majority now cites it. 
 
In fact, rather than insisting that Rule 60(b) motions 
are null and void unless in reference to a clearly final order, 
Torres suggested just the opposite.  We allowed appeal of the 
denial of a motion brought under Rule 60(b), even though the 
motion was in reference to a seemingly interlocutory order.  
We took a functional approach to assessing finality and 
determined that, when an otherwise interlocutory order would 
“likely escape appellate review, the district court properly 
considered that order as final for purposes of Rule 60(b),” 
making its “denial of the motion ... final and appealable ... .”  
Id. at 169.  We thus declined to adopt the rigidly formalistic 
interpretation of Rule 60 that today’s Majority relies upon. 
 
We extended Torres’s flexible analysis in a later case, 
Penn West Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, to hold that, “even 
where an underlying order is purely interlocutory, we may 
nonetheless review a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) 
motion if the denial has the effect of ‘wrap[ping] up all 
matters pending on the docket, thus making the decision 
final.’”  371 F.3d 118, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Torres, 
125 F.3d at 168).  That language from Penn West plainly 
authorizes a district court to entertain a premature Rule 60(b) 
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motion to review an order that is itself interlocutory – exactly 
what the District Court was doing with the order dismissing 
the Whiteside claims.5  Accord Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & O 
Enterprises, Inc., 773 F.2d 151, 153 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The 
denial of a motion under Rule 60(b) is a final and appealable 
order, and this could be so in rare cases even when the 
underlying order is interlocutory.” (emphasis added)).  Penn 
West also teaches that whether a district court’s decision on a 
Rule 60(b) motion is itself final or interlocutory depends on a 
functional analysis of whether it “wrap[s] up all matters 
pending.”  371 F.3d at 124. 
 
If one takes the position that State National’s motion to 
reconsider should be addressed as a Rule 60(b) motion, I 
would say that Penn West controls and compels us to rule that 
State National’s Rule 60(b) motion was proper, thereby 
tolling the time to appeal.  In Penn West, we considered 
whether Rule 60(b) applied to a motion to reopen a case that 
had been administratively closed.  Id. at 126.  We ruled that 
an administrative closing was not a final order, so that it was 
inappropriate for the district court to consider reopening the 
case under the restrictions of Rule 60(b).  Rather than treat 
                                              
5 Whiteside suggests that Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(a)(4)(A)(vi) cuts against this reading because it 
tolls the time to appeal a Rule 60 motion only “if the motion 
is filed no later than 28 days after the judgment is entered.”  
But, though that language is clear in saying that the motion 
must be filed before 28 days have elapsed after final 
judgment, it says nothing about whether a motion may toll if 
filed before judgment is made final. 
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the premature Rule 60(b) motion as null and void, though, we 
remanded to the district court to consider the motion under an 
equitable analysis without Rule 60(b) restrictions.  Id. at 128-
29.6  Applying those principles to this case, the District Court 
could have properly considered the Rule 60(b) motion and 
given it more liberal treatment because it was initiated before 
the interlocutory order dismissing the claims against 
Whiteside was made final. 
 
2. State National’s Motion as a Ripened 
Rule 60(b) Motion When the Underlying 
Interlocutory Order Became Final 
 
The Majority provides no reason why the District 
Court could not have treated State National’s premature Rule 
60(b) motion as having ripened into a true Rule 60(b) motion 
after the stipulation of dismissal was filed and the order 
                                              
6 The Penn West holding also reaffirms that the proper 
way to evaluate the appealed motion is as a decision by the 
District Court under its inherent powers to reopen an 
interlocutory decision.  The Majority appears to agree that, 
prior to the stipulation of dismissal, that is how the District 
Court should have reconsidered its dismissal of Whiteside.  It 
is odd to say that the strictures of Rule 60(b) suddenly 
attached to the Court’s reconsideration in progress merely 
because another party was dismissed.  It may, therefore, have 
been improper for the District Court to rely on Rule 
60(b)(6)’s exceptional circumstances requirement in denying 
the motion.  But that speaks only to the appropriate standard 
for the District Court in reconsidering its decision, not to its 
ongoing jurisdiction. 
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dismissing Whiteside became unambiguously final.  As 
explained above, Torres and Penn West undermine the 
Majority’s determination that a premature Rule 60(b) motion 
is thereafter a nullity, since in both those cases we considered 
appeals of Rule 60(b) rulings when the underlying order’s 
finality was uncertain.  Indeed, no one in this case understood 
the procedural events in the way that the Majority now does.  
State National and Whiteside litigated before the District 
Court under the assumption that the motion at issue was valid 
under Rule 60(b), and they did so with the active approval 
and encouragement of the District Court.  It is thus not just 
contrary to the Rules and our own precedent for us to declare, 
on appeal, that such good-faith litigation amounts only to 
“sound and fury, signifying nothing,” William Shakespeare, 
MacBeth act 5, sc. 5; it is contrary to the first-hand 
understanding of all the participants in the process. 
 
Practical considerations also support an interpretation 
of Rule 60(b) that would allow the District Court to 
reconsider the dismissal of the claims against Whiteside.  
Under the Majority’s reading of the Rule, the District Court 
was free to reconsider the Whiteside dismissal under its 
inherent powers before State National and the County signed 
the stipulation of dismissal, but it was immediately stripped 
of all jurisdiction the moment the stipulation was entered.  
Such a conclusion effectively abrogates Rule 60(b) in cases in 
which there is a Rule 41 stipulation of dismissal.  In the 
present case, it provides no point at which State National 
could have sought Rule 60(b) review of Whiteside’s 
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dismissal.7  As my colleagues would have it, State National’s 
motion to renew its claims against Whiteside was either a 
nullity when filed or was voided with the entry of the 
stipulation.  Either way, their position suggests that the 
District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider a Rule 60(b) 
motion concerning Whiteside’s dismissal once the stipulation 
with the County was filed.  If that were correct, then the 
Rules arbitrarily require a plaintiff in such circumstances to 
abandon settlement with one defendant in order to give the 
district court time to mull over independent claims against 
another defendant. 
                                              
7 My colleagues in the Majority seemingly 
acknowledge that they are abolishing Rule 60(b) relief for 
parties in State National’s position, because they argue that 
the Rule 60 motion was filed both too early and too late.  It 
was too early for purposes of Rule 60 because it sought to 
review a dismissal order that was “interlocutory,” so that a 
“Rule 60(b)(6) motion was not a proper avenue by which to 
challenge [Whiteside’s] dismissal.”  (Majority Op. at 10-11.)  
At the same time, the motion was too late for purposes of 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A)(vi) because 
the “judgment” it sought to review “was entered years 
before,” so that the motion did not satisfy the 28-day time 
limit for Rule 4 tolling.  (Majority Op. at 21.)  Therefore, in 
the Majority’s reading, State National’s motion was defective 
because it asked for relief from a dismissal order that was the 
Schrödinger’s cat of procedural rulings – simultaneously too 
alive as an interlocutory order for purposes of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60 and too dead as a final judgment for 
purposes of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4. 
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That is a particularly strange result because Rule 41 
dismissals may themselves be reviewed by a district court 
under Rule 60(b).  We have held that “any time a district 
court enters a judgment, even one dismissing a case by 
stipulation of the parties, it retains, by virtue of Rule 60(b), 
jurisdiction to entertain a later motion to vacate the judgment 
on the grounds specified in the rule.”  Sawka v. Healtheast, 
Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation 
omitted).8  Even if a district court did not retain jurisdiction 
over settlement enforcement, we suggested in Sawka that it 
could set aside the settlement under “extraordinary 
circumstances” under Rule 60(b)(6).  Id. at 140; see also 
Bryan, 752 F.3d at 321 (“[T]he same ancillary jurisdiction 
that supports post-judgment enforcement proceedings 
supports proceedings to seek relief from the judgment.”).  If 
State National could seek Rule 60(b)(6) review of the actual 
stipulation of dismissal that supposedly stripped the District 
Court of all jurisdiction, it only makes sense that it could seek 
the same review of the order dismissing Whiteside, which 
became final – and thus appealable – only when the 
stipulation of dismissal was entered. 
                                              
8 In Kokkonen, the Supreme Court considered a circuit 
split on the question of when a Rule 60(b) motion may reopen 
a case after a stipulation of dismissal.  511 U.S. at 378.  The 
Court noted that some circuits allow “reopening of the 
dismissed suit by reason of breach of the agreement that was 
the basis for dismissal,” while other circuits – ours included, 
in Sawka – do not treat that as sufficient.  Id.  The Court 
observed that its ruling in Kokkonen did not resolve that 
question because reopening a suit is a separate question from 
enforcing a settlement.  Id. 
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A district court’s ability to grant post-judgment relief 
in a case like this is especially valuable.  The basis of State 
National’s motion to renew its claims against Whiteside was 
that the District Court’s legal reasoning had shifted over the 
course of the litigation in a way that now would allow State 
National to assert malpractice claims against Whiteside.  If 
changes in the District Court’s legal reasoning really did 
undermine the final judgment, that is precisely the kind of 
error that Rule 60(b) is meant to address, by allowing district 
courts to correct and clarify their logic in the first instance 
rather than forcing an unnecessary appeal of a muddled final 
judgment.9 
 
C. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 and 
the Purpose of the Appellate Rules 
 
Under the legal theories I have discussed, the clock for 
a timely appeal began to run with the District Court’s 
December 1, 2014 order denying the motion for leave to 
renew the claims against Whiteside.  Under the inherent 
authority theory, there simply was no final judgment with 
regard to Whiteside until December 1, 2014, since the District 
Court had reopened the matter by entertaining the motion to 
reverse its interlocutory order.  If, instead, the motion were to 
be treated as a Rule 60(b) motion, it tolled the time to appeal 
pending its resolution because it was filed “no later than 28 
                                              
9 I hasten to add that I am not saying or implying that 
State National’s assertions about the District Court’s 
reasoning are accurate.  Nor am I suggesting that, if we got to 
the merits, State National should prevail.  I am only saying 
that we can and should get to the merits. 
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days after the judgment.”  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A).  In 
either case, the December 16, 2014 appeal was “within 30 
days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from” and 
was therefore timely.  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A)(vi). 
 
Both interpretations comport with the purpose of the 
Rules to have district courts fully resolve a case before it is 
appealed.  As the Advisory Committee elaborated when it 
clarified Rule 4(a)(4) in 1979, “it would be undesirable to 
proceed with the appeal while the district court has before it a 
motion the granting of which would vacate or alter the 
judgment appealed from.”  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) advisory 
committee’s note to 1979 amendment; see also Griggs v. 
Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58-59 (1982) 
(observing one reason for the reform of Rule 4(a)(4) was to 
“clarify both the litigants’ timetable and the courts’ respective 
jurisdictions,” in service of the principle “that a federal 
district court and a federal court of appeals should not attempt 
to assert jurisdiction over a case simultaneously.”). 
 
In contrast, the Majority’s holding frustrates the 
purpose of the Rules to limit appeals to truly final decisions.  
As we explained in Penn West, “a ‘final decision’ for 
purposes of appeal” is generally “‘one which ends the 
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do 
but execute the judgment.’”  371 F.3d at 125 (quoting Catlin 
v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).  “[T]here is no 
final order if claims remain unresolved and their resolution is 
to occur in the district court.” Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer 
East, Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 557 (3d Cir. 1997).  The Majority’s 
reading of the Rules throws into confusion what constitutes a 
final decision in a multi-claim, multi-party case where some 
claims are resolved via voluntary dismissal under Federal 
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Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A).  In the case before us, 
the Majority would have forced State National to file an 
appeal even as the District Court was actively considering a 
motion before it on the claims against Whiteside. 
 
The alternatives I have suggested better comport, I 
believe, with the text and purpose of the Rules.  Neither 
would treat cases disposed of by Rule 41 dramatically 
differently from those ended by other means, and both would 
give district courts the opportunity to resolve all the matters 
before them without encouraging parties to jump the gun with 
a premature appeal.  Both would facilitate settlement by not 
forcing plaintiffs to abandon claims against certain defendants 
in order to settle with others.  And, in keeping with 
Kokkonen, neither would do anything to expand the ancillary 
jurisdiction of federal courts. 
 
I share the Majority’s desire that parties be encouraged 
to appeal in a timely manner.  But I am also concerned with 
interrupting our district courts’ complete adjudication of cases 
before appeal, and I would not create hyper-technical traps 
for prospective appellants.  The ordinary course of an 
adjudication is to reach final judgment, to resolve any post-
judgment motions enumerated in Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(a)(4)(A), and then for the aggrieved party to 
timely appeal.  Under the able guidance of the District Court, 
that is the course this case took, and I would not strain to read 
complexities into the Rules that interrupt that sequence.10 
                                              
10 If the Majority’s reading of the Rules is indeed 
correct, I cannot believe that such a result is what the Rules 
Committees of the Judicial Conference intended.  I encourage 
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II. Conclusion 
 
This case proceeded before the District Court in model 
fashion.  The various claims were resolved in sequence; the 
parties were given a full opportunity to ventilate their issues; 
and, after the last remaining issue was definitively decided by 
the District Court, the aggrieved party appealed in short order.  
We should not interpret procedural rules to upset that orderly 
routine.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
                                                                                                     
the Civil Rules Committee to provide clarification for Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 41 to assure that Rule 60(b) motions 
may still be considered after the entry of a stipulation of 
dismissal, and likewise encourage the Appellate Rules 
Committee to clarify Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 
so that a stipulation of dismissal cannot be seen as overriding 
the tolling effects of 4(a)(4)(A) motions. 
